



Tweede Kamer
DER STATEN-GENERAAL

Annual report 2020

Report by the Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services
(CIVD) on its activities in 2020

Adopted on 8 April 2021

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1 Report

Adopted on 8 April 2021

The Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services has the honour of publishing a report on its activities in 2020.

Chair of the Committee,
Hermans

Clerk of the Committee,
Van der Leeden

2 Introduction

The annual report first describes the remit and basis of the Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (hereinafter the Committee) and gives a brief explanation of the various meetings and types of meetings held by the Committee and of the Committee's activities, and of the documents it deals with. The composition and support of the Committee are also discussed, as well as the frequency and attendance rate of the meetings in 2020. Finally, a concise chronological overview is provided of the topics and documents, including policy documents, received and discussed by the Committee in 2020.

Given that some information shared is considered state secret, the annual report cannot be regarded as an exhaustive summary of the topics discussed by the Committee.

3 Remit and basis of the Committee

The current Section 7.5¹ of the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives determines that there shall be a Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (hereinafter the Committee). The Committee is charged with parliamentary scrutiny of the operational activities of the General Intelligence and Security Service (hereinafter the AIVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (hereinafter the MIVD). This means that the Committee in principle only deals with classified information. The basis for providing the Committee with classified information confidentially is laid down in Article 68 of the Dutch Constitution, which governs the duty to provide information to both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Additionally, the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (hereinafter the ISS Act 2017) foresees the possibility of providing the Senate and the House of Representatives with confidential information.²

The ISS Act 2017 introduced a provision concerning the processing of reports of suspected misconduct at the AIVD or MIVD by the complaints handling department of the Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (hereinafter the CTIVD). Pursuant to Section 131(8) of the ISS Act 2017, classified data from rulings concerning a report and a minister's response to it may be confidentially shared with the Senate or the House of Representatives. In practice, this means that the Committee has to be informed about this.³ However, this has not yet occurred since the entering into force of the ISS Act 2017.

¹ The Rules of Procedure were revised in 2020. The revised Rules of Procedure entered into force on 31 March 2021. Section 22 of the previous Rules of Procedure dealt with the Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services.

² See in particular Sections 12 and 113 of the ISS Act 2017.

³ *Parliamentary document*, 34 588, no. 3, p. 186 (MvT – explanatory memorandum).

4 Meetings and activities of the Committee

The Committee meets at least once a month for meetings and working visits. However, this proved unachievable during this reporting year as a result of the measures taken in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic (see paragraph 6).

Regular meetings

During the regular meetings, documents and policy documents are discussed from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Justice and Security concerning the AIVD, the MIVD and the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (hereinafter the NCTV). In addition, classified documents from the CTIVD, the Netherlands Court of Audit and – since its establishment in the context of the ISS Act 2017 – of the Review Board for the Use of Powers (hereinafter the TIB⁴) are discussed, as are the responses by the ministers in question. Finally, the Committee is informed orally and in writing about current events, and presentations are given on specific topics or countries.

These meetings are generally attended by the ministers concerned (Interior and Kingdom Relations, Defence, and Justice and Security), the Secretaries-General of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and of the Ministry of Defence, the (Deputy) Director-General of the AIVD (accompanied by no more than one AIVD official), the (Deputy) Director of the MIVD (accompanied by no more than one MIVD official) and the (deputy) NCTV (accompanied by no more than one NCTV official).

Additional meetings

Additional meetings are planned on an ad hoc basis with the minister or ministers concerned, for example as a result of a specific event.

Meetings with third parties

Apart from meetings with ministers, the Committee holds meetings with the CTIVD, the Netherlands Court of Audit, and the TIB. Topics of discussion include the secret appendices to CTIVD review reports, classified reports from the Netherlands Court of Audit, and classified letters from the TIB.

Meetings only attended by members of the Committee

These meetings involve only the Committee members, and are generally decision-making in nature. This includes taking decisions on the Committee's annual plan and annual report, on its working procedure, and on specific topics dealt with in the regular meetings. In addition, the Committee takes decisions on dealing with letters received from third parties and on the hosting of delegations from abroad.

⁴ The TIB is an independent committee that decides beforehand on the legitimacy of the most infringing privacy interferences used by the security services authorised by the responsible minister. See www.tib-ivd.nl.

Working visits

The Committee aims to pay several working visits to the AIVD, MIVD and the NCTV every year. The Committee members may also pay working visits in an individual capacity.

As well as the Committee members, all meetings and activities are attended by the clerk and the advisor of the Committee.⁵ Reports of the meetings and talks are drawn up, which are then adopted by the Committee at its next meeting. These reports are classified.


⁵ See also Section 5.

5 Committee meeting documents

This section provides an overview of the various documents, including policy documents, discussed by the Committee.

5.1 AIVD/MIVD budget and accountability information

Budgetary procedure and financial accountability of AIVD/MIVD



Graph 1. See appendix for larger version of this graph.

Below is a brief explanation of the documents discussed by the Committee in relation to the budget and accountability cycle.

Integrated Intelligence and Security Order

The Integrated Intelligence and Security Order describes the need for intelligence of various parties and is jointly established by the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and the Minister of Defence in consultation with the Minister of Justice and Security and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Integrated Intelligence and Security Order comprises a public section, which is published in the Government Gazette of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and a confidential section. The confidential section is discussed by the Committee, and contains the investigation objectives for the coming four years as well as the division of tasks between the AIVD and the MIVD.

Annual plans

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence work out the details of the Integrated Intelligence and Security Order in the annual plans (investigation plans) for the AIVD and the MIVD respectively. Due to their content, the annual plans are classified; however, they are published in general terms and offered to the House of Representatives (more specifically to the standing committees on Interior Affairs and Defence). The confidential annual plans are shared in full with the Committee.

Progress reports

The AIVD and the MIVD issue progress reports twice a year. In these progress reports, which are classified, the AIVD and the MIVD account for the progress of their operational activities, as established in the annual plans, for the period concerned.

Budget letters

In 2018 it was agreed with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence that, when the (public) budgets of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Defence are sent to the House of Representatives every September, the Committee would be informed about the classified aspects of these budgets. These letters inform the Committee in general terms about the budget breakdown for the various sections of the AIVD and the MIVD. They also focus on any trends that will be of relevance to national security in the forthcoming year. For each service, the letters include an appendix with graphs illustrating the relevant figures.

Annual reports

Before 1 May of each year, the AIVD and the MIVD simultaneously provide the Senate and the House of Representatives with a public report on the manner in which they have performed their tasks in the previous calendar year. These reports contain a full overview of at least the following matters, in accordance with the ISS Act 2017:

- the areas on which the service has focused its activities in the past year;
- the areas on which the service will be focusing its activities during the present year.

The public version of the annual report does not mention details that afford insight into:

- the means deployed by the service in specific cases;
- secret sources used by the service;
- the service's current knowledge level.

The ministers can provide such details confidentially to the Senate and/or the House of Representatives. In practice, this means that the AIVD and the MIVD provide the Committee with an annual report that is classified as secret.

5.2 Other meeting documents

Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands

The Committee also examines the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands (hereinafter DTN). The DTN is based on information from the AIVD and the MIVD, and is published by the NCTV two or three times a year. A public version of the DTN is available, which is discussed in the Standing Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Security. The classified version of the DTN is discussed in the CIVD.

The Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands

The Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands (hereinafter CSBN) is an annual publication by the NCTV that affords insight into developments, interests, threats, and resilience relating to cyber security. It is produced in collaboration with public parties such as the AIVD and the MIVD, and private parties. Since 2018, there has also been a classified version of the CSBN, which is dealt with by the Committee.

Intelligence Assessment of Threats to National Security

The Intelligence Assessment of Threats to National Security is generally drawn up once every four years by the AIVD and the MIVD. It represents the services' joint vision in relation to threats to the national security interests of the Netherlands. In 2020, the Committee examined the intelligence assessment for the first time.

Letters on current issues

Before every regular meeting, the Committee receives a letter on current issues from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence. Through these letters, the MIVD and the AIVD inform the Committee about current events and developments.

Letters from ministers containing supplementary information

The Committee can request the ministers responsible to provide supplementary information on specific topics. Such information is sometimes presented orally, but is often shared with the Committee by means of a letter. The ministers in question may also send letters to the Committee on their own initiative. Outstanding promises to the Committee are sometimes also dealt with by letter from the minister concerned. All letters from ministers to the Committee are put on the agenda.

Review reports from the CTIVD

Some CTIVD review reports include classified appendices. These appendices are always offered to the Committee by the minister concerned and are discussed on two occasions:

- The CTIVD gives an explanation of the report during a meeting, and answers any questions the Committee may have. The ministers are absent during this meeting.
- The report, the accompanying classified appendix, and the minister's response are discussed at a regular Committee meeting, during which the minister

concerned may be questioned by the Committee. The CTIVD is not present at this meeting.

Classified letters from the TIB

The CIVD did not receive any classified documents from the TIB in 2020.

Classified reports from the Netherlands Court of Audit

The Committee also examines documents from the Netherlands Court of Audit, including classified letters accompanying the results of accountability audits, or secret appendices to reports. Documents from the Netherlands Court of Audit are also always first discussed in a meeting with the Netherlands Court of Audit before being discussed with the ministers concerned.

Letters from third parties

Finally, the Committee receives letters from citizens and institutions containing questions, complaints, or comments concerning the AIVD and the MIVD. It is decided during meetings (with only the members of the Committee) what action is to be taken regarding these letters.

6 Composition and support to the Committee

In 2020, pursuant to Section 22(2) of the then prevailing Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives, the Committee consisted of members Dijkhoff (VVD) – the Chair of the Committee, Wilders (PVV), Heerma (CDA), Klaver (GroenLinks), Jetten (D66), and Asscher (PvdA).

The Committee is supported by a clerk, an advisor and two part-time assistants. The clerk and the advisor jointly take care of such matters as preparing and planning meetings, drawing up annotations, recommendations and minutes of meetings, as well as maintaining official contacts with the AIVD, the MIVD, the ministries, the CTIVD, the Netherlands Court of Audit, and the TIB. The clerk focuses mainly on the process, while the advisor concentrates on content. The responsibilities of the assistants to the Committee include receiving, registering, and sending documents, including postal documents, and archiving them, scheduling meetings, and inviting ministers, Committee members, and third parties to the various activities of the Committee. All four members of staff have been screened by the AIVD and are in possession of a Certificate of No Objection (hereinafter VGB).


The Committee is also supported by the Analysis and Research Department (DAO) of the House of Representatives. For every regular meeting, two information specialists supply an overview of news reports concerning intelligence and security services in the Netherlands and abroad. The information specialists concerned do not have a Certificate of No Objection and are therefore not privy to the topics discussed by the Committee (other than what is subsequently stated in the annual reports). They draw up the overviews solely on the basis of public sources.

7 Frequency of and rate of attendance at meetings

In 2020, the Committee held a total of ten meetings:

Regular meetings	7
Additional meetings (scheduled following a specific event, for example)	0
Discussions with the Netherlands Court of Audit	0
Discussions with the CTIVD	1
Discussions with the TIB	0
Meetings only attended by Committee members	2
Total for 2020	10


The numbers are considerably lower than those of 2018 and 2019, when the Committee met 26 and 21 times respectively (see *Graph 2*). As a result of the measures taken against the COVID-19 pandemic, the Committee was unable to meet as often in 2020. The Committee did not meet at all between February and June.



Graph 2

In addition to the above meetings, the Committee paid one working visit in 2020. During this working visit, the Committee was extensively briefed by the MIVD and the AIVD jointly about digital espionage and disruption from certain countries. Two other working visits scheduled for 2020 could not take place as a result of the measures taken against the COVID-19 pandemic.

The average rate of attendance at the meetings in 2020 was 70% (see *Graph 3*).



Graph 3

8 Chronological overview of topics and documents, including policy documents, discussed by the Committee

30 January 2020

On 30 January 2020, the Committee met in a regular meeting with the Minister of Defence, who was also the Minister for the AIVD,⁶ and the Minister of Justice and Security.

In view of the letter on current issues from the AIVD, discussions were held about the freedom of movement of a terrorist organisation in a particular country and on the possibility of making this information public. The topic had already repeatedly been discussed in the Committee's 2019 meetings. Discussions were also held about the movements of jihadists on online platforms, an arrested member of ISIS, and a foreign intelligence service. The vulnerability of Citrix servers was also a subject of discussion.

In view of the letter on current issues from the MIVD, discussions were held about a cyber attack and the state actor said to be behind it.

The Committee was also given a detailed briefing by the MIVD about the country-based investigations in the Sahel region of Africa. The matters raised were the political situation in the region, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism.

The AIVD also gave a presentation on an investigation into a specific country. This included an explanation of the focus of the investigation and a description of the intelligence assessment, and information about the resources used by the AIVD for the purpose of the investigation.

In the context of undertakings made, discussions were held about several Dutch males who at the time were in detention in northeast Syria, and the risks that they posed. Discussions also took place about Fatah and Hamas supporters in the Netherlands.

Finally, the committee reflected on the departure of Mr Schoof as Director-General of the AIVD.

20 February 2020

On 20 February 2020, the Committee met once in a regular meeting with the Minister of Defence, who was also the Minister for the AIVD, and the Minister of Justice and Security.

⁶ From November 2019 until April 2020, the Minister of Defence, Mrs. Bijleveld, was also the Minister for the AIVD because of the absence of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Mrs. Ollongren.

The Intelligence Assessment of Threats to National Security – which is produced jointly by the AIVD and the MIVD, generally once every four years – was discussed at this meeting for the first time. The services explained the document with the help of a presentation. It was agreed that the Committee would be informed of any changes between now and the next Intelligence Assessment.

The Committee was also given a presentation about intelligence activities by a state actor in relation to a specific subject.

In the light of the letter on current issues by the AIVD, discussions were held on, among other things, the escape of female Dutch citizens from refugee camps in Syria, the stabbing of two people in London on 2 February by a jihadist who had been released from detention early and the question what lessons the Netherlands could learn from this, a digital attack on an education institute, and a collaboration between two countries.

In response to the MIVD's letter on current affairs, questions were asked regarding Russia's intentions in the Middle East and North Africa, a foreign digital espionage actor, and other matters.

8 June 2020

In the regular meeting of 8 June, the Committee met with the Ministers of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, of Defence, and of Justice and Security. The first item for discussion was the secret DTN52. There was a focus on the increased security awareness among jihadists, the Terrorist Detention Units, the potential threat posed by returning female escapees from Syrian refugee camps, the threat from right-wing extremism, the deployment of infiltrators in certain environments, the threat from a Nazi group and climate-related action where extremist action is regarded as possible, and the terrorist threat in the Netherlands. Discussions were again held about the freedom of movement of a terrorist organisation in a particular country and on the possibility of making this information public.

The classified 2019 annual report by the AIVD was also discussed at this meeting. The members asked about the developments regarding extreme right-wing ideology, how the Netherlands could arm itself against foreign influence in what was an election year, the consequences for ISIS of the death of al-Baghdadi, the activities of foreign intelligence services in the Netherlands, and the recruitment attempts made by a particular country in the Netherlands. There was also a discussion about whether or not the objectives contained in the Integrated Intelligence and Security Order were achieved or not.

The classified 2019 annual report by the MIVD was also dealt with. In that context, there was a discussion about the Russia investigation, China-based digital espionage, and other matters. Questions were also asked about why there is no capacity for a particular investigation, why the communication interception statistics were not set out in the annual report despite a previous promise to do so, and how the services decide

whether or not to collaborate with a fellow foreign service (in the context of the weighting memorandums).

In response to the AIVD's letter on current issues, questions were asked about the reports in the NRC on the Hazimi movement in the Netherlands,⁷ a secret foreign unit, and about an individual returning from Syria who was subsequently arrested. A more detailed explanation was given about this arrest.

With regard to the MIVD's letter on current issues, questions were asked about a publication in an intelligence journal, cyber activities by Russia in a particular country, and Iran's ballistics programme. The Minister of Defence undertook to give the Committee a briefing on the last-mentioned subject at a subsequent meeting.

Two letters which the Committee had requested and received from the ministers were also discussed at the meeting, concerning the COVID-19 pandemic and the report entitled 'IS op de weg terug' in De Telegraaf.⁸ Finally, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations responded to a question that had been asked in the public debate but which could not be answered in public. This was the question of whether there are any countries in Europe with which the Netherlands does not share information because of the fear that such information would be passed on to other countries.⁹

23 June 2020

The Committee met on 23 June 2020 for a meeting with only the Committee members. The Committee discussed and adopted its draft annual report for 2019 at the meeting. Several letters that had been received from citizens were also discussed, as was the request by the ISS Act 2017 Evaluation Committee to have a discussion with the Committee.

24 September 2020

On 24 September 2020, the Committee met once in a regular meeting with the Ministers of Defence, of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and of Justice and Security.

The first progress report by both the AIVD and the MIVD – covering 1 January to 30 April 2020 – was examined at the meeting. Against that background, a discussion was held about the possible impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the capacity and intelligence position of the AIVD and MIVD and the degree to which the pandemic is hindering, or indeed helping, opponents. There was also a discussion about the increase in cyber activities aimed at the global care sector as a result of the pandemic. The growth of the threat from the extreme right was discussed as well, as were Iran's ballistics programme and the arrest on 3 February 2020 of an Iranian as a result of a report by

⁷ NRC, 7 June 2020, 'Onderzoek: dreiging door extreme afsplitsing van IS'.

⁸ De Telegraaf, 13 May 2020, 'IS op de weg terug; Terreurorganisatie slaat steeds vaker toe.'

⁹ Verbatim reports of parliamentary proceedings II, 2019-2020 session, no. 78, item 6, pp. 7 and 13.

the AIVD on suspicion of preparing an attack and participation in a terrorist organisation.

The secret budgets of the AIVD and the MIVD for 2021 were also discussed. In response to the AIVD budget, there was a discussion about the consequences of the pandemic on the recruitment and selection of employees by the AIVD, the shared premises of the AIVD and the MIVD, and the threat from anti-government and right-wing extremists. With regard to these threats, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations undertook to give more careful consideration to the matter when dealing with the next DTN.

The Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2020 (CSBN) was also extensively discussed. The Committee raised various topics, such as the potential digital disruption and sabotage of vital infrastructure by a particular country, one specific subject that also featured on several occasions in 2019 and 2020 at the Committee's meetings, a previously discussed cyber attack on a server at one of the Defence departments,¹⁰ the access by an advanced state actor into the network of a foreign company, and the digital resilience of the Netherlands.

In the context of the AIVD letter on current issues, discussions took place about the threat posed by ISIS towards a specific individual, the attack on a motorway near Berlin in which people were deliberately targeted by a vehicle, contacts between ISIS and jihadist networks in European countries, the reports in the media about President Putin seeking unification with Belarus, members of a female ISIS battalion and a female Moroccan-Dutch traveller who had reported to the Dutch Consulate General in Istanbul.

Finally, the meeting briefly considered the CTIVD review reports that were issued in September about the gathering of bulk datasets using the hacking powers and the subsequent processing of same by the AIVD and the MIVD, and about the gathering and continued processing of airline passenger data by the AIVD and the MIVD.¹¹

4 November 2020

On 4 November the Committee met twice: once for a meeting with the CTIVD and once for a regular meeting.

Meeting with the CTIVD

The meeting with the CTIVD focused on the aforementioned secret appendices to the review reports by the CTIVD about the gathering and processing of bulk datasets.¹² A number of operations in which the CTIVD had identified irregularities were explained and discussed. In that context, there was a discussion about differences in interpretation of the ISS Act 2017 between the Ministers of the Interior and Kingdom

¹⁰ Regular meeting of 30 January 2020.

¹¹ *Parliamentary document* 29 924, no. 203 (appendices).

¹² *Parliamentary document* 29 924, no. 203 (appendices).

Relations and of Defence on the one hand, and the CTIVD on the other. The possibility of the need to amend the ISS Act 2017 was also discussed.

Regular meeting

In the regular meeting, the Committee spoke with the Ministers of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, of Defence, and of Justice and Security. The first point of discussion was the aforementioned CTIVD review reports.

The recent attacks in Paris and Vienna were discussed, in the context of the AIVD's letter on current issues. The AIVD also explained the jihadist landscape in the Netherlands.

Based on an earlier undertaking, the MIVD gave a detailed briefing about a particular country. A letter from the Minister of Defence about a specific case was also discussed. Finally, several undertakings were fulfilled.

19 November 2020

The Committee met once on 19 November 2020 in a regular meeting with the Ministers of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and of Justice and Security. The Minister of Defence was represented by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

The DTN53 was dealt with in detail during the meeting. Questions were asked about, among other things, the potential threat posed by those travelling out of the country and returning to it, jihadist women in the Netherlands, the fact that West Africa is an area of expansion for AQ and ISIS, the Nusaybah battalion of ISIS, contacts between ISIS and jihadist networks in European countries, and the impact of the death of Muhammed al-Masri. Other matters about which questions were asked were a foundation in the Netherlands, anti-government violence and conspiracy theories that are circulating about COVID-19 and 5G, two individuals employed in the public sector with close links to a salafist mosque, the challenge of following security-aware targets, and the adding of the *Feuerkrieg Division* organisation on the United Kingdom's list of terrorist organisations.

The Committee also dealt with the second progress reports by both the AIVD and the MIVD, covering April 2020 to August 2020. With regard to the AIVD progress report, questions were asked as to why some objectives had not been attained. The reports about the NSA, which was said to have spied on its allies from Denmark, were then discussed,¹³ as were a transnational facilitating network of AQ, the activities of foreign intelligence services in the Netherlands, and the activities of intelligence services against EU institutions. There was also additional discussion about differences in interpretation of the ISS Act 2017 between the Ministers of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and of Defence on the one hand, and the CTIVD on the other.

¹³ See de Volkskrant, 16 November 2020, 'Amerikaanse NSA zou ook Nederland bespioneren', and elsewhere.

Finally, the MIVD gave a detailed briefing during the meeting about military cyber sabotage by a particular country.

10 December 2020

On 10 December, the Committee met for a regular meeting and a meeting behind closed doors.

Meeting only attended by members of the Committee

The Committee discussed and adopted the annual plan for 2021 behind closed doors. The Committee also decided to submit a proposal to amend Section 22 of the Rules of Procedure of the House of Representatives,¹⁴ creating the possibility for the leaders of parliamentary groups who do not wish to be members of the CIVD, even though they are members by law, of renouncing their membership. The amendment was adopted by the House of Representatives on 25 February 2021.¹⁵¹⁶ The CIVD was also informed about the imminent addition of an advisor to the CIVD staff. Finally, several letters from citizens were discussed.

Regular meeting

During the regular meeting, the updated version of the Integrated Intelligence and Security Order 2021-2022 was discussed with the Ministers of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and of Defence. The annual plans for 2021 of both the MIVD and the AIVD were dealt with as well.

In the light of the MIVD annual plan, questions were asked about whether the agreed deployment in a particular country was still realistic, given the recent developments there. Discussions also took place on industrial safety and about developments in right-wing extremism in relation to the armed forces, and about investments in two joint AIVD and MIVD investigations.

In the context of the AIVD annual plan, the Committee and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations discussed the possibility of undesirable political influence in the Netherlands, the long arm of Assad in the Netherlands in the light of reports in the media, and collaboration with a particular country.

As a result of the AIVD's letter on current issues, a specific and recurring subject was again raised, as were the Terrorist Detention Units, the early release of a jihadist who was deported to his own country, and media reports about an attack by hackers on the EMA (European Medicines Agency)¹⁷. Finally, the Committee was given extensive information about the classified details of the disruption by the AIVD of a Russian intelligence operation. The House of Representatives was publicly informed later that

¹⁴ Section 7.5 of the revised Rules of Procedure.

¹⁵ Parliamentary document 35 322, no. 28.

¹⁶ Parliamentary document II 2021/21, no. 59, votes.

¹⁷ See Het Parool, 9 December 2020, 'Pfizer: documenten vaccin ingezien door hackers EMA', and elsewhere.

day about this disruption by letter.¹⁸ When dealing with the MIVD's letter on current issues, discussions were held about the unusual activities of a state actor in a particular area.

In accordance with an earlier undertaking, the AIVD, the MIVD, and the NCTV gave a joint briefing about the digital threat to the Dutch telecoms sector. Finally, several other outstanding undertakings were fulfilled.

¹⁸ Parliamentary document II 2020/21, 30 977, no. 157 (Letter to Parliament).


9 Processing of third party letters

In 2020, the Committee dealt with six letters from citizens. The Committee forwarded three of the letters to other House of Representatives Committees, while taking cognisance of two of the letters, and in one case the Committee advised the party concerned to follow the appropriate procedure, whereby complaints are dealt with initially by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and, failing that, by the CTIVD.

10 Appendix: graph 1

Budgetary procedure and financial accountability of AIVD/MIVD

**House of Representatives
(public)**



**Committee for the Intelligence
and Security Services (secret)**